Posts Tagged ‘Irish Government’

Irish Government Summonsed to Court on Charges of Illegal Activity (Bank Bailouts)

Thursday, March 29th, 2012

On Tuesday 27th March Ben Gilroy, John Squires and ‘People for Economic Justice’ served a summons on the Irish government to answer charges of illegal activity over the bank bailout. The bailout is illegal under Bunreacht Na hEireann, the Irish Constitution.

It is also illegal under international law.
An injunction was applied for to prevent the payment of a €3.1 billion euro Anglo bond due to be paid this Saturday 31st March 2012.
The judge has given two weeks for the State to respond.

Please support Ben and John and People for Economic Justice in any way you can. The economic situation in Ireland has been caused by illegal activity. Those responsible must be held responsible, and the payments must be stopped.

Irish political party Fine Gael were elected on the promise of stopping this madness but have not done so.

www.peopleforeconomicjustice.com
Constitution halts sheriff http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PpUjl4LvQM8&feature=relmfu
What happened next http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=odX-oTdjIeI
https://twitter.com/#!/bengilroy (Ben on Twitter)
Constitution in the video -http://www.eire2016.com/pdf/irish-text.pdf
http://DefendOurHomesLeague.ie
http://ItsNotOurDebt.com
http://UnitedLeftAlliance.org
http://AntiEvictionTaskForce.com

Allowing Banks to Fail is a Far, Far Better Option!

Thursday, February 2nd, 2012

Iceland fared better than us by letting its banks fail

By Thomas Molloy

ICELAND pursued better policies than Ireland or Latvia when the three countries’ economies collapsed in 2007 because the Reykjavik government allowed banks to fail, according to a new report by the influential Bruegel think tank.

The report by economist Zsolt Darvas looked at the response of the three small and open economies. The three countries all initially allowed the credit boom to fuel property speculation and investment imbalances. As the crisis began, property prices fell, banks went bust and all three countries had to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for help.

The governments then introduced fiscal austerity programmes, structural reforms and reforms of the banking system. These similarities allow economists to compare the different responses in an attempt to determine what worked best.

“The experience with the collapse of the gigantic Icelandic banking system suggests that letting banks fail when they had a faulty business model can be the right choice,” the report notes.

“The banking sector suffered meltdown in Iceland and foreign lenders to banks suffered massive losses. Yet, the crisis impact was much more benign in Iceland than Latvia.”

Mr Darvas notes that it was the last Fianna Fail-led government’s decision to issue a bank guarantee to Irish-based banks [that led to the crisis deepening] but adds that Ireland then came under pressure from the European Central Bank to keep the guarantee in place.

“While socialising bank losses in Ireland was initially an Irish decision, later, when the Irish government wanted to change course, European institutions barred it primarily in the name of financial stability in the euro area and beyond,” he writes.

The report is sceptical that a collapse in the Irish banking sector would have harmed the rest of the eurozone.

“Little is known about what would have happened to financial stability outside Ireland in the event of letting Irish banks default, but one thing is clear: other countries have benefited from the Irish socialisation of a large share of bank losses, which has significantly contributed to the explosion of Irish public debt,” it adds.

Regulation

The only way to avoid potential cross-country spillovers of national bank collapses would be to centralise the regulation and supervision of European banking along with the system for bailing out insolvent lenders, the report concludes.

“There is a strong case for a banking federation,” states the report.

Iceland has suffered least among the three countries. Latvia has suffered most since the economic crisis began — seeing a bigger collapse in output than any other country in the world, the report notes.

Ireland has endured the fifth worst economic contraction, while Iceland’s was the seventh worst. Latvia has also suffered the worst declines in employment. Iceland came out from the crisis with the smallest drop in employment (-5pc).

The good news for all three countries is that recovery has begun in each economy. Latvia is seeing the fastest improvements, although this has not yet generated many jobs. Both Latvia and Iceland have returned to the bond markets.

- Thomas Molloy

Irish Independent

If the Irish Government Really Wants to Tackle Fraud, It Should Take on the Banks €63bn Fraud

Wednesday, January 11th, 2012

If the Government really wants to tackle fraud, it should take on banks

By Colette Browne Irish Examiner

Ireland_for_Sale_by_banksters_for_bankstersTHE Government is engaged in a campaign of vilification against those claiming social protection benefits despite an Oireachtas report revealing the proportion of fraudulent overpayments actually decreased by more than half between 2007 and 2010.
Headlines across a variety of media screamed last week that the numbers of people reporting suspected cases of social welfare fraud skyrocketed from just 579 instances in 2006 to over 16,000 in 2011.

Minister for Social Protection Joan Burton suggested the “sharp increase” in the number of anonymous tips-offs was emblematic of a “cultural shift” in the traditional Irish aversion to snitching to authorities.

“At a time when resources are limited, many feel strongly that those limited resources should be used for the benefit of people who need them most,” she said.

Meanwhile, Minister of State for Finance Brian Hayes, insisted €625m will be saved in a clamp-down in social welfare fraud next year. “People aren’t putting up with it any more. They may have turned a blind eye in the good times but they are not prepared to see their neighbours scam the system as they did in the past and that’s a good thing for the country,” he said, having predicted that the large rise in tip-offs would lead to a commensurate increase in savings for the Government.

Of course, the only problem with Hayes’s thesis is that it totally ignores all the available evidence and jumps to a completely baseless, but entirely self-serving, conclusion. First of all, there is absolutely no data that suggest that any of these calls actually led to the Government saving a single penny — the bald figures were just reported, without any context, giving the impression that each and every call led to the apprehension of a fraudster.

So, to be clear, of the total 16,142 calls received by the department, just 12,304 were deemed worthy of follow up but there is no information to suggest how many, if any, of these reports actually saved the department any money.

While Ministers Bruton and Hayes were last week desperately relying on the figures to try to back up their assertions that social welfare fraud is rampant, a report by the Oireachtas Library and Research Service, which one hopes both ministers have actually read, published in October revealed that the proportion of fraudulent overpayments has actually decreased in recent years despite the vastly increased number of reviews now being conducted.

According to its figures, fraudulent overpayments increased from €21.4m in 2007 to €25.9m in 2010 but the proportion of total overpayments, which rose from €50.5m to €83.4m, attributable to fraud actually decreased from 42.4% in 2007 to just 21.1% over the period.

Despite the Government’s attempts to conjure up notions of vast swathes of evil families callously defrauding the Irish state to avoid working for a living, the rather more staid reality is that the vast majority of any overpayments made in the system are directly attributable to its unwieldy and complicated nature.

People filling out forms invariably make mistakes and sometimes these mistakes are not spotted by staff while staff members themselves, all of whom are under huge amounts of pressure dealing with vastly increased workloads when there is an embargo on hiring in the public sector, also get it wrong on occasion.

Minister Hayes’s confident assertion that an increase in the number of untested anonymous tip-offs will lead to significant savings for the Irish state makes absolutely no sense when the department’s own near doubling of reviews has lead to a negligible increase in savings — from an estimated €476m in 2008 to €483.2m in 2010, a decrease on the €484m that was estimated in 2009.

“These figures demonstrate that fraud and error is being detected through control mechanisms but also show that the rate of return in terms of estimated savings is declining. For instance, although the number of reviews increased by 65% from 2008 to 2010 the amount of savings achieved rose by only 1.5%,” said the Oireachtas report.

The demonisation of people in receipt of social welfare payments also flies in the face of research from the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) which found that only 3% of unemployed people would be better off if they continued to claim social welfare rather than rejoining the workforce.

In fact, the report found that the vast majority of unemployed people would see their income at least double if they returned to work, and that only one in eight welfare recipients actually receives a rent or mortgage supplement, exploding the urban legend myth of millionaire dole claimants cheating the system.

Of course, this is totally divergent to the campaign of misinformation from the government that is increasingly resorting to employing lazy stereotypes about the unemployed, and those in receipt of social welfare payments, in order to justify the huge cutbacks that will be necessary in the Department of Social Protection to meet the terms of the bailout deal.

Two new reports by the EU Commission and the IMF have both cited the inevitable need for adjustments in tax bands and credit, coupled with cuts in social protection, to provide “the bulk of savings” necessary if fiscal targets laid down by the troika are to be met.

WITH successive budgets already having gouged over €20 billion from the domestic economy, the government is fast running out of options in how to continue to pare back spending on pesky things like support for disabled children and elderly people’s fuel allowance when it faces the prospect of spending up to €4.7bn for 10 years, from 2013, on the really important stuff — repaying monies that were used to bail out Anglo Irish and Irish Nationwide.

Its determination to continue to apply economic medicine that is demonstrably killing the patient was this week highlighted by Nobel Prize winning economist Paul Krugman who said that Ireland’s depressed economy was a poster child for the failed policy of austerity.

“The real test of Keynesian economics … has come from European nations like Greece and Ireland that had to impose savage fiscal austerity as a condition for receiving emergency loans — and have suffered depression-level economic slumps, with real GDP in both countries down by double digits,” he wrote in a column in the New York Times.

Krugman was citing a new research document which compared the responses of Latvia, Iceland and Ireland to their respective banking crises and found that Iceland, which suffered the biggest collapse, fared the best because banks’ debts were not socialised by its government.

“The experience with the collapse of the gigantic Icelandic banking system suggests that letting banks fail when they had a faulty business model can be the right choice … other countries have benefited from the Irish socialisation of a large share of bank losses, which has significantly contributed to the explosion of Irish public debt [estimated to reach 60% of GDP by 2013],” concluded the report.

If the Government is determined to tackle fraud then I would suggest it concentrate its efforts on the alleged fraud in the Irish banking sector that has cost the state over €63bn, and counting, to date.

Read more: http://www.examiner.ie/opinion/columnists/colette-browne/if-the-government-really-wants-to-tackle-fraud-it-should-take-on-banks-178991.html#ixzz1iU7YYDDZ

Ex- Senior Irish Government Ministers Regret ‘Rushed’ Bank Guarantee Scam

Sunday, November 6th, 2011

Ireland_for_Sale_by_banksters_for_banksters
By JOHN DRENNAN

The legitimacy of the infamous bank guarantee of September 2008, which was the catalyst for Ireland’s subsequent bailout by the IMF, has been called into question by two of the senior ministers in the cabinet on that fateful night.

In a major new RTE documentary, Crisis — Inside the Cowen Government, former ministers Willie O’Dea and Mary Hanafin are deeply critical of the rushed manner in which the decision was taken.

And, in a further revelation, the former Green Party leader John Gormley openly admits that the bank guarantee, where the State took responsibility for more than €400bn of banking debt, was totally based on the theories of the celebrity economist David McWilliams.

Speaking to the Sunday Independent, one figure involved in the making of the documentary claimed the programme casts “real doubts on the validity of the decision taken by the cabinet on the guarantee”.

They added that the testimony of the two former ministers certainly suggests the methodology by which the decision was taken “verged on the territories of being ultra vires” and that ministers were “bounced” into a decision in circumstances that resembled “an ultimatum” where they were effectively given “no choices or opportunities for debate”.

In the documentary, both Ms Hanafin and Mr O’Dea say they were effectively given no alternative but to approve the decision to offer a blanket guarantee to all of Ireland’s banks in the early hours of the morning.

According to Mr O’Dea, ministers who were phoned to approve an incorporeal cabinet decision in the early hours of September 30, 2008, were told that, “the markets were opening in the morning and there was the possibility of no money in the ATMs” and that “nothing short of this full absolute guarantee would save the situation”.

Ms Hanafin, who in the programme is shown defending the Irish banking system on the night of the guarantee, said ministers were told that “it was the only option to protect people’s money and it had to be done before the markets opened”.

Both ministers are now critical of the way decisions were taken.

“It was probably the most far reaching decision I ever participated in my five years in cabinet and I would have liked to have sat around the table to discuss it,” Mr O’Dea says.

Mr O’Dea openly admits that “the government did not have a mandate” to do the banking guarantee and says “in retrospect, it would have been better for the country if a fresh government” had come to power at that stage.

Mary Hanafin, who in the documentary says that she had been informed earlier that day that “there will be decisions” taken on the banking crisis “before the night was over” is openly critical of the shambolic nature of the decision making.

She claims “that decision shouldn’t have been taken at a quarter to two in the morning. . . on the phone.”

The former minister also said that in a scenario where Finance “had known for some time that there was going to be a decision. . . all cabinet members should have been called to Dublin”.

Ms Hanafin also notes that in spite of the serious level of disagreement within Finance over the best solution to the crisis, ministers were presented with a fait accompli.

The former minister is backed by Mr O’Dea, who says the cabinet were told “nothing short of the full, unequivocal guarantee would save the situation”.

Current FF leader Micheal Martin will say that at the time of the guarantee “the solvency issue did not surface. Time and time again it was liquidity, liquidity, liquidity”.

Mr Martin, though, is implicitly contradicted by the former government minister Eamon Ryan, who admits that whilst everyone in the wake of the guarantee was talking about a liquidity crisis, “most of the people knew we had gone over the cliff”.

In a stark display of the lack of faith that then Finance Minister Brian Lenihan had in his department officials, Mr Gormley tells the documentary of his “clear recollection” of asking Mr Lenihan: “Are you going with the David McWilliams option?” and of feeling “fairly satisfied” when Mr Lenihan said he was.

Though the decision was to ultimately play a central role in the IMF/EU bailout; Mr McWilliams defends his advice on the grounds that whilst he advocated a guarantee, having done “the easy bit”, the government had failed to follow his advice to “fire the top guys”, to “default on some of the bond-holders” and close down bad banks in the manner that the Swedes did.

The programme also paints a poignant portrait of Mr Cowen as a Taoiseach “haunted by a sense of guilt” over his failures as a finance minister.

In tomorrow’s episode, Mary O’Rourke charitably observes of the allegations that surrounded Mr Cowen’s relationship with alcohol that “Brian Cowen was very shy. . . maybe the few drinks helped him. . . loosened his tongue” and “brought him back to a happier time, a space where life wasn’t as difficult or humdrum as it had become”.

But it is believed that in a subsequent episode, Ms Hanafin is scathing about the drinking culture that would ultimately drown the party.

The programme also reveals that PJ Mara and other senior Fianna Fail figures begged Mr Cowen to address the communications deficit in his performance.

Mr Mara says that he and several others tried to persuade Mr Cowen “at least four or five times over a period of nine months” but it was “drift, drift, drift”.

http://www.independent.ie/opinion/columnists/john-drennan/john-drennan-exff-ministers-lament-rushed-bank-guarantee-2927164.html